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Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine’s modernisation 
efforts stall due to lack of local government reform
Tadeusz Iwański, Piotr Żochowski
President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to de-
centralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever 
since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform 
is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation 
efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the re-
gions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges 
facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have 
reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to 
implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive 
reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. 
In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of 
experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial 
organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are 
two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the 
fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient 
administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined 
powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks 
delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of 
the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, 
it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of 
concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that 
Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This 
in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of 
funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by 
implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to 
relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and 
would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. 
The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also un-
likely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in 
Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be un-
able to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic 
development of the country’s regions.
1	 Концепція	реформи	місцевого	самоврядування	та	територіальної	організації	влади	в	Україні,
 http://civil-rada.in.ua/?p=477
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Ukraine’s current administrative division 
and self-governance
The administrative geography of Ukraine was 
formalised	between	1917	and	1960,	and	has	re-
mained unaltered to the present day. The cur-
rent system is not suited to a market economy 
and fails to address the challenges posed by 
economic and demographic factors such as em-
igration or internal migration to cities from rural 
areas or towns built around large factories2.
Under	the	1996	Constitution,	Ukraine	is	a	uni-
tary state3.	 The	 principle	 of	 local	 governance,	
introduced	by	Article	140	of	 the	Constitution,	
defines	 local	 governance	 as	 “the	 right	 of	 the	
residents	 of	 a	 single	 village,	 or	 a	 voluntarily	
formed community (hromada) of several villag-
es,	a	city	district	or	a	whole	city	–	to	govern	on	
issues	of	local	importance,	within	the	limits	set	
by the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine.”4 
According	 to	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 powers	 of	
governance lie with a community in the man-
ner	prescribed	by	law,	both	directly	or	through	
local councils. Article 133 of the Constitution 
specifies	 a	 three-tier	 administrative-territorial	
division of Ukraine into:
• 24	 counties	 (oblasts),	 including	 two	 cities	
with	 special	 status	 (Kyiv	 and	Sevastopol),	 and	
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea;
2 Experts suggest that between 10 and 15 villages and 
towns are abandoned in Ukraine every year; 80% of 
the	rural	population	are	pensioners,	and	the	number	of	
people living in rural areas dropped by 2.5 million be-
tween 1991 and 2011. Disparities are also seen in the 
size and population of territorial units of the same level 
and	their	fragmentation	–	46%	of	Ukrainian	villages	and	
towns	have	a	population	of	less	than	1,000	people,	and	
in most of them local councils lack the support of exec-
utive bodies. See for example a report by the ZIK News 
Agency	Україні	щороку	зникають	сіл	10-15,	http://zik.
ua/ua/news/2012/06/21/355078 and http://civil-rada.
in.ua/?p=477
3 The formation of and changes to administrative and 
territorial divisions in Ukraine are still regulated under 
the provisions of a decree issued on 12 September 1981 
by the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. 
4 The functions of local authorities in the cities of Kyiv and 
Sevastopol are regulated under different provisions.   
• 490	districts	(raions),	including	smaller	towns	
and boroughs of major cities;
• 12,000	silradas	(or	village	councils,	which	in-
clude an average of three administrative units 
– a town or a village).
Ukraine’s local government units consist of vil-
lage	 councils,	 town	 councils	 and	 city	 councils	
and are run by holovas (or heads of local coun-
cils). The councillors and heads of councils are 
elected by popular vote.
Local councils at county and district level do 
not have executive powers. This function is 
performed	by	the	regional	offices	of	state	ad-
ministration (Raionna or Oblasna derzhavna 
administratsiya),	which	operate	at	 the	 level	of	
counties,	districts,	and	in	the	cities	of	Kyiv	and	
Sevastopol.	Their	heads	are	appointed	by,	and	
report	to,	the	president,	although	they	are	di-
rectly monitored by local authorities (councils) 
on how they execute the powers given to them 
by	the	councils	under	Ukrainian	 law,	a	council	
has	the	power	to	hold	a	vote	of	no	confidence	
in	the	regional	office	of	the	head	of	the	state	
administration,	but	 the	president	 is	bound	by	
the outcome of the vote only if the vote is car-
ried by a two-thirds majority. 
The flaws of the current local 
government system
Despite the constitutional and statutory provi-
sions	 mentioned	 above,	 serious	 inefficiencies	
have been observed in the functioning the 
executive branch of Ukraine’s local govern-
ment. According to the Local Government Act 
The administrative geography of Ukraine 
was formalised between 1917 and 1960; 
it is not suited to a market economy and 
fails to address the challenges posed by 
economic and demographic factors.
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of	21	May	1997,	elected	local	government	bod-
ies (i.e. local councils at all levels) have the right 
to	 appoint	 their	 executive	 bodies.	 In	 reality,	
however,	 local	 government	 executive	 bodies	
at	county	and	district	levels	are	not	appointed,	
most likely due to the fact that the law does 
not impose such an obligation and does not 
define	their	prerogatives.	Although	in	principle	
local authorities enjoy extensive powers under 
Ukrainian	law,	in	practice	their	capacity	to	gov-
ern	is	restricted	by	other	laws,	especially	those	
regulating	the	provision	of	funding,	which	make	
it impossible for the councils to carry out their 
duties.	As	a	 result,	the role of local councils 
in governing local communities in Ukraine 
is marginal. The notable exceptions are the 
Ukrainian	 cities,	 where	 city	 councils	 work	 to-
gether with local executive bodies headed by 
a mayor. This continues to be the case despite 
the	 fact	 that	 in	 1997	Ukraine	 ratified	 the	 Eu-
ropean Charter of Local Self-Government and 
committed itself to further reforming its local 
government and extending its powers. Most 
of	 these	 declarations,	 however,	 have	 still	 not	
been implemented. This includes the subsidiar-
ity principle5,	which	 is	 crucial	 for	 cooperation	
between the various levels of local government.
The dominant feature of the relationship be-
tween the capital (the centre) and the regions 
5 The principle of subsidiarity states that each level of gov-
ernment ought to perform only those tasks that cannot 
be performed effectively at a more immediate or local 
level.
–	despite	their	statutory	basis	–	is	the weakness 
of local authorities when compared to state 
administration agencies at the county and 
district level. The lack of executive bodies work-
ing alongside county and district councils means 
that	key	decisions,	especially	financial	ones,	are	
made	by	state	administration	officers,	who	re-
port directly to the President of Ukraine rather 
than to local residents6.	As	a	result,	the	council	
are unable to enforce the adopted decisions.
Another factor weakening the position of local 
authorities in their dealings with state admin-
istration was the decision to strip councils of 
their powers to manage land outside residen-
tial areas. These powers have been transferred 
to local representatives of the state administra-
tion.	Meanwhile,	a	law	passed	in	October	2012	
has transferred the powers to manage arable 
land	from	regional	government	offices	and	silra-
das to the State Agency for Land Resources. So 
far,	however,	the	process	of	marking	administra-
tive boundaries of urban and rural settlements 
has	not	been	completed,	making	 it	difficult	 to	
identify exactly which areas come under the 
management of the Agency. Another problem 
is the division of public property between the 
different levels of local government	–	villages,	
towns,	 cities,	districts	and	counties,	 as	well	 as	
the existence of multiple territorial units with-
in,	 for	example,	a	single	city	 (i.e.	 towns	within	
a	 city,	with	 districts	 inside	 them),	which	 leads	
to confusion over the powers of the respective 
authorities.
The opaque relationship between the two 
types of authorities in the regions (local and 
central) is further compounded by the fact that 
effective cooperation often depends on infor-
mal relations between local authorities and 
state	 administration	 officials.	 The	 quality	 of	
local governance is also negatively affected by 
party	conflicts,	which	directly	impact	the	rela-
6 Local budgets are developed and approved by the coun-
cils,	but	the	responsibility	for	their	implementation	lies	
with local representatives of the state administration.
The dominant feature of the relationship 
between the capital and the regions is the 
weakness of local authorities when com-
pared to central government agencies at the 
county and district level. In effect, outside of 
Ukrainian cities, local councils have little in-
fluence on the situation in the regions.
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tions between state administration represen-
tatives at the county and district level (mostly 
representing the interests of the ruling Party 
of	 Regions)	 and	 local	 authorities	 (councils),	 in	
which opposition parties hold a majority. This 
stalls cooperation at the regional level and pre-
vents	the	implementation	of	specific	tasks	and,	
more	broadly,	slows	down	the	development	of	
Ukraine’s regions.
Local government in Ukraine is characterised 
by	a	 lack	of	financial	 self-sufficiency.	 This	 also	
limits regional development7. Revenues from 
local	taxes	and	fees	are	low,	and	local	authori-
ty budgets (except for those of major cities) are 
heavily dependent on state subsidies. State sub-
sidies account for over 70% of the budgets in 
almost half of the country’s local government 
units at present8,	and	the	state	administration	
representatives in the regions have the decisive 
influence	 on	 their	 spending.	 The	 distribution	
of funding from the state budget to local au-
thorities	 is	also	highly	 ineffective,	especially	 in	
times	 of	 economic	 downturn.	 At	 present,	 just	
as	during	the	2009	economic	crisis,	the	amount	
of funding reaching local budgets is lower than 
the	level	originally	set	in	the	state	budget,	and	
the missing money is often used by central gov-
ernment	to	“patch	holes”	in	the	state’s	finances.
Increasing restrictions on self-government
The gradual loss of powers by local authorities 
in Ukraine has been noticed not only by experts 
from	outside	the	government,	but	also	by	senior	
state	 officials.	Over	 the	 past	 two	 years,	 Parlia-
7	 According	to	Stepan	Neshyk,	deputy	head	of	Vinnytsia	
County	Council,	the	average	annual	budget	of	the	local	
councils	across	the	county	in	2012	was	about	€50,000.	
Half	the	budget	was	raised	locally,	the	other	half	came	
from state subsidies. Up to 98% of this amount was 
swallowed up by the salaries and energy bills of pub-
lic	sector	services.	This	left	just	€1,000	for	road	repairs	
and	other	projects	for	the	whole	year,	http://www.viche.
info/journal/3360/
8	 Концепція	 реформи	 місцевого	 самоврядування…, 
op. cit.
ment has passed more than twenty laws that 
have transferred a range of powers from local 
councils to central government. As a result of 
these	changes,	county	and	district	councils	have,	
for	 example,	 lost	 control	 of	 the	 endorsement	
of	 spatial	 planning	 applications,	 and	 no	 lon-
ger have the power to take part in shaping lo-
cal	projects,	including	investment	ones,	funded	
through the Regional Development Fund9. Cen-
tral government also scrapped a licence fee for 
individuals	selling	goods	at	markets	and	bazaars,	
which used to generate over half the revenue for 
local	authorities,	while	a	local	road	tax	(payable	
by	 vehicle	 owners),	which	 formed	 another	 im-
portant	 source	of	 income	 for	 the	 councils,	has	
been	 replaced	 by	 excise	 duty	 on	 fuel,	 which	
feeds the state budget. The new State Budget 
Code (which sets out the rules of the Ukrainian 
budget	system,	 including	 its	structure,	 its	 legal	
basis,	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 local	 and	
state budgets) has not provided local authori-
ties	with	additional	sources	of	 income,	but	has	
increased the number of services they need to 
provide.	In	addition	to	this,	the	Code	allows	cen-
tral government to move funding from one local 
authority	to	another	during	the	financial	year10. 
9 The Regional Development Fund was established in Jan-
uary	2012	to	help	finance	investment	programmes	and	
projects in the Ukrainian regions. The Fund’s 2013 bud-
get has been set at about $430 million. Although many 
people	support	the	creation	of	the	Fund,	the	manner	in	
which it has been operating has been criticised by ex-
perts.	See,	for	example,	the	opinion	of	Kyiv’s	Civil	Soci-
ety	Institute,	http://www.csi.org.ua/www/?p=2454
10	 Levitsky	O.,	Бюджетна децентралізація по-українськи: 
забрати і поділити, http://economics.unian.net/ukr/de-
tail/127941
The revenues from local taxes and fees 
are low, and local authorities are heavi-
ly dependent on subsidies from the state 
budget. The potential for regional growth 
therefore remains limited.
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Consequently,	 the	 central	 authorities	 have	 in-
creased	their	control	over	financial	flows	in	the	
country,	have	delegated	new	duties	to	the	local	
level without offering extra funding to enable 
councils to deal with their new responsibilities. 
In	 effect,	 they	have	been	deprived	of	financial	
self-sufficiency.	One	striking	example	of	the	ef-
forts to weaken local government in Ukraine was 
the	political	 conflict	over	 control	of	 the	city	of	
Kyiv. Following protracted political wrangling 
with	 Kyiv’s	 mayor,	 Leonid	 Chernovetsky,	 elect-
ed	in	2008,	the	Verkhovna	Rada	adopted	a	se-
ries of amendments to the Law on the Capital 
of Ukraine in 201011.	Until	then,	the	functions	of	
the city mayor and the Head of the City State Ad-
ministration	had	been	held	by	one	person	–	the	
elected mayor. The amendments to the Act have 
separated these two functions and the executive 
powers of the mayor of Kyiv have been drastical-
ly	reduced.	In	June	2012,	Chernovetsky	resigned.	
Due to low public support for the Party of Re-
gions	 in	Kyiv,	 the	date	for	a	new	mayoral	elec-
tion in the capital has not yet been announced. 
Meanwhile,	 full	 power	 in	 the	 city	 have	 been	
handed	over	to	Oleksandr	Popov	(closely	linked	
to	the	president’s	milieu),	appointed	in	Novem-
ber	2010	by	Viktor	Yanukovych	for	 the	post	of	
the Head of the City State Administration. As 
a	 result,	 the	 person	 currently	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
capital,	who	takes	all	the	key	decisions	and	con-
trols	the	city’s	finances,	is	not	an	elected	official.
11	 The	Law	on	the	Capital	of	Ukraine	–	the	hero	city	of	Kiev	
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2500-17
Political reasons for the lack of local 
government reform
Ukrainian	president,	Viktor	Yanukovych	has	of-
ten stated that the authorities in Kyiv see the 
decentralisation reform as a priority issue12. The 
pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine has 
also	been	recorded	in	official	state	documents	
of strategic importance13.	 In	 reality,	 however,	
very little has been done to implement change 
in	 this	 area,	 and	 some	 observers	 have	 noted	
that the government has recently moved back-
wards	on	the	issue.	One	of	the	recent	decisions	
suggesting that this might indeed be the case 
has	been	the	move	by	President	Yanukovych’s	
administration to abandon the plans for local 
government reform developed by the previous 
cabinet14.
There are a number of reasons why the reform 
is	 still	 to	 be	 implemented,	 including	 both	 fi-
nancial and political reasons. The reluctance to 
transfer additional powers to local authorities 
and to increase their budgets stems from Kyiv’s 
fear of losing direct control over the political 
processes taking place in the Ukrainian regions. 
The current funding distribution model pro-
vides	the	politicians	in	Kyiv	with	more	influence	
over how funds are allocated and how they 
are	 spent.	 In	 practice,	 this	model	 creates	 the	
perfect conditions for the abuse of power and 
corruption since politicians are able to transfer 
subsidies and grants to particular local govern-
ment bodies in exchange for personal favours. 
The system can also be abused by offering 
greater subsidies to those parts of the country 
12	 See	 the	 statements	 made	 by	 President	 Yanukovych,	
available	 on	 his	 official	 web	 pages,	 http://www.presi-
dent.gov.ua/news/25730.html,	 http://www.president.
gov.ua/news/25571.html,	http://www.president.gov.ua/
news/25902.html 
13	 See,	 for	 example,	 Модернізація – наш стратегічний 
вибір, http://www.president.gov.ua/docs/Poslannya_
sborka.pdf
14	 See,	 for	 example,	 Tkachuk	 A.,	 Про взаємзв’язок 
реформи державної регіональної політики та 
політики з децентралізації влади, http://www.csi.org.
ua/www/?p=2633
The current government has no real in-
terest in pressing on with the decentral-
isation reform, as the proposed changes 
would limit its control over political pro-
cesses in the country and the distribution 
of funding to local authorities.
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where the Party of Regions has the most sup-
porters,	 or	where	 the	money	 can	 be	 used	 to	
win	new	voters.	This	was	the	case	in	2010-2011,	
when more than half of state subsidies (over 
€300 million) were received by Ukraine’s richest 
counties:	Donetsk,	Luhansk,	Kyiv,	and	the	Kyiv	
metropolitan area15.
Furthermore,	 a	 comprehensive	 decentralisa-
tion	 reform	would	 require	 significant	 financial	
resources,	 which	 would	 become	 a	 substantial	
burden on the state coffers. The reform has also 
been resisted by civil servants at various levels 
of state administration because the proposed 
changes would inevitably lead to job cuts. The 
decision to suspend the transfer of powers from 
central to local government and to retain the 
current funding model has also been driven by 
Ukraine’s political calendar. The implementation 
of the reform could upset large parts of the elec-
torate as well as the army of civil servants based 
in the regions. This in turn would limit the local 
state	 administration	officials’	motivation	 either	
to mobilise voters and win their support in the 
upcoming	election	or	 to	“help”	 the	 ruling	par-
ty achieve the necessary results. It has also been 
suggested	 that	 in	 view	 of	 the	 2015	 elections,	
central government is likely to accumulate funds 
–	rather	than	distribute	them	to	local	authorities	
–	in	order	to	be	able	to	announce	new	social	ini-
tiatives immediately prior to the election. Anoth-
er obstacle for regional development in Ukraine 
is posed by the preference of both civil servants 
and	politicians	for	a	centralised	state	model,	gov-
erned	by	the	administrative	apparatus,	and	the	
habit of ignoring elected representative bodies. 
Moreover,	Ukraine’s	political	discourse	does	not	
make a clear distinction between the concepts 
of decentralisation and federalisation. Federali-
sation,	understood	as	an	excessive	autonomy	of	
15	 See,	 for	 example,	 the	 report	 by	 the	 Kyiv-based	 Lab-
oratory	 for	 Legislative	 Initiatives,	 Донеччина,	 Київ 
й	 Луганшчина	 отримують	 більше	 половини	 всіх	
субсидій	 і	 капітальних	 трансфертів,	 http://parla-
ment.org.ua/index.php?action=publication&id=8&ar_
id=2729&ch_id=43&as=0
the	regions,	tends	to	be	associated	with	separat-
ism,	and	although	 these	notions	do	 from	time	
to	time	appear	in	Galicia	and	Zakarpattia,	there	
is	no	real	threat	of	secession.	Nonetheless,	this	
argument has been hijacked by those politicians 
who oppose the transfer of additional powers to 
local authorities.
It is important to stress that the current govern-
ment has no real interest in pressing on with 
the	 decentralisation	 reform,	 and	 this	 means	
that the biggest lobbyists for the reform: the 
Ukrainian Association of Local Councils and 
the	Association	of	Ukrainian	Cities,	 supported	
by	local	political	experts,	do	not	have	enough	
clout to persuade the cabinet to implement the 
proposed	changes.	Consequently,	although	the	
government has drawn up a draft document 
detailing its approach to the reform of local 
government and the territorial organisation of 
power	in	Ukraine,	experts	do	not	expect	more	
than	isolated,	small-scale	measures,	such	as	the	
creation of a legal framework for the consoli-
dation of silradas.	However,	the	full	implemen-
tation	 of	 the	 document	 within	 the	 specified	
timeframe (2013-2015) is highly unlikely16. This 
approach is also visible in the steps taken by the 
new government to ease budget crises in many 
regions–they	tend	to	be	ad	hoc	rather	than	sys-
temic measures17.
Conclusions
Despite the declarations made by President 
Viktor	Yanukovych,	who	has	stressed	the	need	
to strengthen the importance of Ukraine’s re-
gions	in	the	process	of	governance,	the	actual	
measures undertaken by the president in the 
last three years have led towards an even greater 
16 The implementation of the reform in the near future has 
been	ruled	out	even	by	its	supporter,	parliament	speaker	
Volodymyr	Rybak,	who	cites	the	general	lack	of	money	
and political instability in the country as the two main 
reasons for the delay.  
17	 See,	 Арбузов	 буде	 щоденно	 викликати	 собі	 на	 ки-
лим	по	жертві,	8/01/2013,	http://www.pravda.com.ua/
news/2013/01/8/6981079/
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centralisation of power in Ukraine. The decision 
to suspend the transfer of powers from central 
government	 to	 local	 authorities,	 and	 to	 strip	
local councils of some of their existing powers 
and	 financial	 resources,	 has	 left	 Ukraine	with 
a much more centralised system of government 
than	before	2010.	As	a	result,	Ukraine’s	regions	
are	 becoming	 less	 competitive,	 lack	 regular	
sources	of	funding,	and	are	heavily	dependent	
on decisions taken in Kyiv. This has hampered 
growth and increased disparities in living stan-
dards	between	the	regions.	Nonetheless,	what	
needs to be stressed is that local government 
reform	in	Ukraine	is	essential,	as	the	current	ad-
ministrative structure is unable to address the 
changes that occurred after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Its delay is stalling economic de-
velopment	in	the	regions	and,	by	extension,	the	
modernisation efforts of the whole country. 
The situation is compounded by the persistence 
of	significant	differences	in	the	way	state	subsi-
dies are allocated to particular regions. In light 
of	 the	above,	 the	plan	 for	 the	 reform	of	 local	
government and the territorial organisation of 
power,	put	forward	in	autumn	2012,	should	be	
seen	as	a	step	in	the	right	direction,	although	it	
would be wise to retain a degree of scepticism 
about the actual chances for a comprehensive 
implementation of the reform.
